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There are just a few areas of a state’s policy that have gained as much importance 
over the last two decades as innovation policy. Innovation policy covers a range of 
different policies (and policy instruments) that have been introduced at various 
points in time, with different motivations, and using a variety of labels; much of 
what is called innovation policy today may previously have gone under labels such 
as industrial policy, science policy, research policy, or technology policy (Edler and 
Fagerberg, 2017). Consequently, innovation policy may be defined broadly as all 
policies that have an impact on innovation, or more narrowly as policies (or policy 
instruments) created with the intent to affect innovation (Edquist, 2004; Fagerberg, 
2017). For the purpose of this article the latter definition is used, as the research 
covers only intentional state interventions.  
 
The growth of innovation policy has triggered changes as regards the rationale for 
state interventions (Chaminade and Edquist, 2010; Mazzucato et al., 2020; Schot 
and Steinmueller, 2018). For example, the traditional market failure and system 
failure justifications for innovation policy intervention have been complemented 
with a more active market creating framework (Mazzucato, 2015). The European 
Union’s innovation policy adjusts to those changes, as the EU tries to keep up and 
follow the most recent research results in this area. A great example of the EU’s 
dedication to following the research is the attempt to implement missions as tools of 
innovation policy in accordance with the mission-oriented innovation policy 
approach (Mazzucato, 2018b; 2019).  
 
Mission-oriented policies are defined as systemic public policies that draw on 
frontier knowledge to attain specific goals (Mazzucato, 2018b). “Missions provide a 
solution, an opportunity, and an approach to address the numerous challenges that 
people face in their daily lives. Whether that be to have clean air to breathe in 
congested cities, to live a healthy and independent life at all ages, to have access to 
digital technologies that improve public services, or to have better and cheaper 
treatment of diseases like cancer” (Mazzucato, 2018b). 
 
The implementation of the mission-oriented innovation policy aims at improving the 
efficiency of tackling the social challenges that are put in front of European leaders 
(Weber and Rohracher, 2012). Such problems have been held for years on issues 
such as climate change, environmental pollution, lifestyle diseases, poverty and 
growing social inequalities. In the first quarter of 2020, the list of major social 
challenges was joined by the rapidly expanding coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 
(hereinafter “coronavirus”) and, later on, the social crisis triggered by the COVID-19 
pandemic. In this case, the state’s intervention using the tools of innovation policy 
was rather natural as the necessity to stop the spread of coronavirus demanded the 
use of a number of innovative solutions in the healthcare sector. For example, 
combating the crisis required the development of vaccines, medications, and 
distributing efficient personal protection equipment as well as creating solutions for 
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remote working and learning, etc. Therefore, many interventions planned within 
innovation policy were ad hoc adjusted to the new circumstances and directed 
towards combating with the pandemic and its consequences.  
 
Various problems tied with the COVID-19 crisis allow the EU to create new 
missions of innovation policy. This potential response of the EU to the coronavirus 
crisis seems reasonable, especially since the implementation of the mission-oriented 
innovation policy by the EU is officially aiming at the already discussed goal of 
increasing the effectiveness of EU’s interventions based on innovation policy to 
target major social challenges.  
 
This article analyses the actions undertaken by the EU with its innovation policy in 
relation to the COVID-19 crisis. It also aims to assess their adherence to the mission-
oriented innovation policy approach simultaneously implemented and promoted by 
the EU. Bearing in mind the fact that this research points to incoherence in the EU’s 
actions, the article also tries to determine the theoretical cause for such 
inconsistencies.  
 
The article first reviews the source literature, which builds the theoretical foundation 
used to determine whether to launch an intervention using innovation policy tools. 
Particular attention is devoted to transformative innovation policy and the 
implementation of the EU’s mission-oriented innovation policy approach. Next, the 
methodology and analysed data are presented. The subsequent part of the paper: (1) 
presents the EU’s actions with innovation policy that aim at counteracting the 
pandemic and, more broadly, the COVID-19 crisis, (2) assesses the possibility of 
using the concept of mission-oriented innovation policy to combat the pandemic and 
the related crisis, and (3) analyses the causes for the very limited use of the mission, 
even though it is potentially the most efficient tool when it comes to handling the 
COVID-19 crisis. Finally, part 5 reaches general conclusions. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 The Changing Rationale for Innovation Policy Intervention 
 
Until nearly half of the 2020s, the justification for an intervention using innovation 
policy was based on two premises: market failure and system failure. Market failure 
may happen where there are limited possibilities to protect intellectual property, 
uncertainty regarding the success of an innovation project, limited options of 
dividing the innovation process or asymmetry of innovation. System failure is tied to 
the insufficient capabilities of the innovation agents (e.g., enterprises, research 
institutes, etc.) related to innovation systems, venture capital funding accessibility, 
subpar cooperation skills or unreliability of institutions such as patent law, norms 
and regulations (de Jong et al., 2015; Kowalski, 2020). Each premise (market failure 
and system failure) stems from a different attitude regarding the state’s intervention 
using innovation policy. The first one is rooted in neoclassical economics and its 
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way of perceiving innovation processes, while the other refers to evolutionary 
economy and invokes the theory of innovation systems (Bach and Matt 2005; 
Chaminade and Edquist, 2010; Diercks et al., 2019; Lipsey and Carlaw, 1998; Schot 
and Steinmueller, 2018; Smith, 2000).  
 
The trend originating in neoclassical economics is characterised by narrowing down 
the innovation process to research and the inventions that follow, perceiving them as 
linear. In other words, that new inventions are seen as a sequence of successive 
stages, where the stage of conducting research is nearly automatically transformed 
into the phase of manufacturing new products, with little regard to using the results 
for creating products that could be successfully launched onto the market 
(Rosenberg, 1982; 1994).  
 
Market failure as a premise for innovation policy intervention as seen by the 
neoclassicists is a strictly theoretical concept, not particularly useful from the 
practical point of view. Chaminade and Edquist point out that “the policy 
implications that emerge from market failure theory (…) are too blunt to provide 
much guidance. They do not indicate how large the subsidies or other interventions 
should be (as it is not possible do determine the optimum level of investment in 
R&D or innovation activities) or within which specific area one should intervene” 
(Chaminade and Edquist, 2010). Moreover, interventions that are to counteract (limit 
or eliminate) certain activity on the market may actually disrupt the market in other 
areas and, consequently, lead to its further failures (Bach and Matt, 2005; 
Chaminade and Edquist, 2010).  
 
The representatives of the second attitude for state intervention using innovation 
policy stem from evolutionary economics and refer to the theory of innovation 
systems (IS), completely abandoning the linear view of innovation processes (Borrás 
and Edquist, 2019; Edquist 1997; Freeman 1987; Lundvall 1992; Nelson 1993). In 
the system-based approach, innovations are a result of complex and non-linear 
processes within which businesses interact in various ways with different types of 
organisations (e.g., financial bodies, state authorities, research facilities, and 
consumers) as well as institutions (e.g., legal regulations and cultural norms, etc.). In 
the course of the above processes, those mutual interactions and the mechanisms that 
facilitate the flow of feedback are highly important (Edquist, 1997; Freeman, 1988; 
Klein et al., 2005; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993). The concepts arising from this 
attitude completely cut themselves off from the neoclassicist theories of the 
sustainable market and the need for state interventions only in the case of failures.  
 
The system-based approach conditions the state intervention on the occurrence of 
problems related to system functioning (referred to as system problems or system 
failures), but the analysis of whether the system functions properly is directed on the 
processes therein (results of actions) and not its individual elements (Edquist 2011). 
Importantly, optimal operations are not considered as part of an assessment of 
innovation system functioning (or a part of it). The idea of optimality completely 
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loses its value here. The current rooted in neoclassicist economics describes market 
failure by comparing the actual state of the market with its optimal configuration. In 
turn, evolutionary economics and the SI theory assumes that the system never 
reaches its optimal functioning. It is, therefore, impossible to determine how this 
optimal system works or is structured and, consequently, cannot be compared with 
the current state of the system (Chaminade and Edquist, 2010).  
 
A possible state intervention is rather a reaction to a system problem revealed while 
juxtaposing a given system with other existing systems. Such comparisons may in 
this respect be carried out from the viewpoint of various concepts of innovation 
systems, in particular: National Innovation Systems (Freeman, 1995; Lundvall, 
2016; 1992; Nelson, 1993), Regional Innovation Systems (Cooke et al., 1997), Open 
Regional Innovation Systems (Belussi et al., 2010), Sectoral Innovation Systems 
(Breschi and Malerba, 1997), Technological Innovation System (Bergek et al., 2008; 
Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991; Carlsson et al., 2002; Hekkert et al., 2007), 
Organizational Innovation Systems (Van Lancker et al., 2016). 
 
The third attitude for perceiving state intervention refers to transformative 
innovation policy and favours the idea in which science and innovation can, and 
should, contribute to overcoming social challenges, including the ones related to 
completing the Sustainable Development Goals (Edler et al., 2016; Fagerberg, 
2018). In other words, it calls for a transformative change that refers to a socio-
technical system change as conceptualised in the sustainability transitions literature 
(Schot and Steinmueller, 2018). Weber and Rohracher (2012) argue that the market 
failure and system failure that underpin innovation policies should be complemented 
by policies aimed at transformation and propose four types of new failures as a 
rationale for policy intervention. The four failures described are directionality 
failure, policy coordination failure, demand-articulation failure, and reflexivity 
failure. The concept outlined by Weber and Rohracher was further expanded by 
Schot and Steinmueller (2018), but the premise for intervention within 
transformative innovation policy included therein should be treated as one out of 
many possible solutions.  
 
On the opposite extreme of the Schot and Steinmueller idea lies the notion of 
intervention posed by Mazzucato, which, importantly for the viewpoint of this 
article, inspired the changes in the rules of conducting innovation policy in the 
European Union (Mazzucato 2016; 2018b). Mazzucato draws attention to the need 
of public organisations being “responsible for actively shaping and creating markets 
and systems, not just fixing them, and for creating wealth, not just redistributing it” 
(Mazzucato, 2018a). While correcting the improper operation of a market or system 
(just as other failures, such as those listed by Schot and Steinmueller) may lead to 
optimising the current situation, creating new markets or industries is tied with 
transformative change mentioned earlier (Robinson and Mazzucato, 2019). In the 
light of the discussed concept, the basic duty of state authorities lies in: (1) 
determining the course for the innovation-related development of the country in a 
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manner that allows for both satisfying the needs of the country itself (in the area of, 
e.g., defence, security, etc.) and its citizens (in the area of, e.g., healthcare, 
education, etc.), as well as (2) taking risks and assisting in the creation of new 
markets in social demand (Edler, 2016; Mazzucato, 2015). Mazzucato ties the 
challenge of leading a state intervention, which aims at shaping new markets, with 
the mission-oriented policy approach, as will be discussed further in the article.  
 
The transformative innovation policy largely breaks the rules of policies that have 
been in force to date and is seen as an emerging new paradigm. Nevertheless, it 
needs to be highlighted that this emerging policy paradigm should be seen “as 
layered upon but not fully replacing earlier paradigms” (Diercks et al., 2019). On 
one hand, it is crucial to notice that researchers expanding the idea of transformative 
innovation policy do not separate themselves from the contemporary legacy of SI 
theory; they instead use it as an inspiration in developing mission-oriented 
innovation systems (Hekkert et al., 2020) or problem-oriented innovation systems 
(Ghazinoory et al., 2020). On the other hand, the main advocates of the SI theory 
have been pointing for a long time to the broad (theoretical) spectrum of potential 
goals for innovation policy. For instance, Borrás and Edquist (2013; 2019) suggest 
that the end goals of this policy may be not only of an economic nature (economic 
growth, employment, competitiveness, etc.) as they may also relate to environmental 
protection, healthcare, defence, security and social objectives. 
  
2.2 Market-Shaping, Mission-Oriented Innovation Policy Approach  
 
Establishing a new direction for the development of the EU’s innovation policy, as 
well as the related need to change the organisation and functioning of the innovation 
systems of member states comes from the fact that EU leaders follow the research on 
the role of a state in the economy. As shown above, Mazzucato drew the attention of 
the state’s role in actively shaping and creating markets and systems; the researcher 
also pointed to the underappreciated role of the state in financing breakthrough 
innovations (Mazzucato, 2013). It is important to remember that even such 
successful companies as Apple or Tesla reached for public support. As Mazzucato 
highlights, it is crucial for the capital that is to finance innovations be patient and 
willing to accept the fact that innovations are very unstable and time consuming.  
 
Up to this point, private equity/venture capital (“PE/VC”) were seen by companies 
as the most desirable source of funding for their high-risk innovation-related 
activity. Mazzucato reveals the weaknesses of such funding when there is a need for 
long-term engagement and flexible adjustments to changing conditions because of, 
e.g., market instability. In such cases, funding from public sources is better than 
PE/VC or commercial banking as it is “patient” and engaged in developing 
innovations, giving the companies a chance to overcome the significant instability of 
innovation processes (Mazzucato, 2013; Mazzucato and Penna, 2014).  
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According to Mazzucato, a transformative change is a process which demands a 
translation of the identified social challenges into solvable problems by determining 
and executing specific missions. In this way, it thereby expands the idea of mission-
oriented innovation policy. This idea in relation to public policy, particularly in 
regards to space exploration, is not a new approach (Chiang, 1990; Ergas, 1986). 
Nevertheless, EU’s innovation policy on the supranational level has not been 
conducted in this manner before. Even though it might seem that directing the 
innovation policy towards achieving specific missions merely means that it receives 
new and precisely formulated goals, the idea behind Mazzucato’s solution – as 
already mentioned, involves a radical change in conducting this policy. Specifically, 
it regards modifications in when, why and how interventions using the tools of 
innovation policy should be applied. Most importantly, Mazzucato recommends that 
states should not focus on fixing markets and/or systems, but create and shape 
markets by directing the policy on completing specific missions (Mazzucato, 2015; 
2018a; 2018b).  
 
Research on various aspects of mission-oriented innovation policy have been 
conducted by numerous researchers for several years (Amanatidou et al., 2014; 
Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, 2012; Foray 2018; Morgan and Marques, 2019; 
Wittmann et al., 2020), yet it should be mentioned that directing the innovation 
policy towards a mission is not identical to implementing the rules of state 
interventions as suggested by Mazzucato. Therefore, this researcher’s concept of 
innovation policy that the EU has decided to implement shall be referred to as the 
market-shaping, mission-oriented policy approach. 
 
From the perspective of Robinson and Mazzucato’s proposal (2019), social 
challenges may be reflected in specific actions via the “intermediary stage” of a 
mission-oriented innovation policy that is to create, shape and direct the 
development of the market. Namely, the changes that would not happen if the 
interventions within said policy would aim at only correcting the malfunctions of 
markets and/or systems. Therefore, the intervention of a state should mainly consist 
in not only preventing inconsistencies (correcting malfunctions) but rather, on taking 
the initiative and shaping markets. Any remedial measures might concern the 
adjustments in the course of market development (if the direction does not facilitate 
the completion of a mission). Innovation policy conducted in this manner becomes 
part of the cross-sector and needs to be coordinated (to a great extent) with the 




This article is a case study that aims at describing and analysing the interventions 
undertaken by the EU using the tools of innovation policy in order to counteract the 
COVID-19 crisis. This case study is of special character as it regards EU’s policy on 
the supranational level, which, because of the uniqueness of such a solution, 
introduces limitations in the possibilities of comparative analysis while also making 
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the analysis results applicable only to a limited extent to the policies conducted by 
specific member states on the national level. Assuming a more detailed perspective, 
this research attempts to confront the EU’s promoted and gradually implemented 
concept of state interventions using market-shaping and mission-oriented innovation 
policy tools with the interventions actually carried out within the innovation policy 
that are to counteract the COVID-19 crisis. 
 
The research was composed of two stages. The first stage was designed to answer 
the question of whether the innovation policy interventions conducted and planned 
by the EU to combat the COVID-19 crisis fall in line with the idea of a market-
shaping, mission-oriented innovation policy (that the EU has officially declared to 
implement in order to improve the efficiency of handling grand social challenges)?  
 
The logic of the research process is subjected to the above research question. First, 
the new manner of interventions using innovation policy tools as implemented by 
the EU was analysed from a theoretical standpoint. Next, I analysed the conducted 
and planned interventions, gathered from official EU reports, documents, and press 
releases (including unprocessed data provided by the EU for the needs of the OECD 
survey). I then sought to determine whether (and to what extent) the EU applied the 
most efficient innovation policy tools (missions) to combat the COVID-19 crisis.   
 
Due to the fact that the abovementioned analysis showed considerable discrepancies 
between the market-shaping and mission-oriented policy approach promoted by the 
EU and the interventions that the EU in fact conducts, or plans to carry out, in 
relation to the COVID-19 crisis, the second stage of this research searches for the 
reasons of such discrepancies. The author seeks the answers to the above questions 
on a theoretical level, referring to the (1) new theory of crisisification of policy-
making in the UE (Rhinard, 2019) and (2) the crisis management framework 
determining the conditions of success or failure in public policies (McConnell, 
2011). The timeframe for the research encompasses a period from 1 March 2020 to 
28 February 2021. 
  
4. Research Results and Discussion 
 
4.1 Interventions Carried Out By the EU within the Innovation Policy to 
Counteract the COVID-19 Crisis 
 
The coronavirus pandemic affected all EU member states. Because of the methods of 
reducing the spread of the virus, especially restrictions in the free movement of 
people and measures related to isolation and/or social distancing, it disrupted the 
way of life for virtually every EU citizen and became the source of a serious social 
and economic crisis.  
 
Even though the character and intensity of the COVID-19 crisis differs among 
particular member states, its universal presence, uniqueness of generated problems 
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and grave socioeconomic consequences led to a belief that counteractive measures 
must be applied, not only by individual member states, but also at the supranational 
level. The joint EU response to the crisis was also necessary due to the fact that 
COVID-19 does not respect borders. Therefore, a new challenge for the 
supranational innovation policy of the EU was born.  
 
Although at the initial phase of the pandemic the borders were temporarily closed 
and countries tried to reduce the spread of the coronavirus on a strictly national 
level, the innovation policy became the area in which the above-national reaction of 
the EU developed relatively quickly. It could even be stated that the pandemic 
revealed EU’s weakness as a community in many areas, but it proved that, when it 
comes to innovation policy, the EU is both ready to act and flexible in changing as 
compared to previously planned interventions.  
 
The initiatives undertaken within innovation policy on the level of the European 
Community as a response to the COVID-19 crisis mainly consisted of direct support 
for research and innovation. The activities undertaken by the European Commission 
(“EC”) focused on: (1) supporting new research and innovation; (2) speeding up 
research by optimising framework conditions; (3) translating research findings into 
public health policy for pandemic response; (4) cooperation with the member states 
and (internal and external) coordination of the undertaken activities; (5) analysis of 
social and economic impact of research and innovation; and (6) supporting 
communication, especially between researchers, innovators and healthcare 
providers.  
 
When it comes to research and innovation, an important role is played by the EU 
Framework Programme for research and innovation, Horizon 2020, which officially 
ended in the year 2020, but some of its projects will run for a few more years. 
Within this programme, the so-called “crisis financing” was released, which 
encompassed important research and innovation in broadly understood healthcare 
areas that were tied with the COVID-19 pandemic, such as: (1) developing 
diagnostics, treatment and vaccines; (2) shifting production to ensure quick 
manufacturing of essential medical equipment and devices; (3) improving medical 
technologies and digital tools to upgrade infection detection as well as patients’ 
monitoring and care; (4) better understanding of behavioural and socioeconomic 
results of the pandemic, for example, in regards to mental health, to develop 
guidelines for bodies shaping healthcare policies, along with improving the overall 
readiness with regard to future events of this kind; (5) analysing large cohorts of 
patients by comparing the cohorts existing within the EU and beyond to assess their 
exposure to some risk factors and deepen the understanding of possible causes for 
the disease as well as improve the reactions to the virus and any future threats to 
public health (EC, 2000g; 2000h; 2000i).  
 
As for financing specific projects/initiatives, the Horizon 2020 funds supported the 
initiative regarding innovative medicine in a public-private partnership between the 
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EU and the pharmaceutical sector. The investments planned within this initiative 
reach a total of 117 mln Euros, with 72 mln coming from the abovementioned 
framework programme (OECD, 2020). Also, it is noteworthy that Horizon 2020 
finances the pilot programme of the European Innovation Council known as the 
Accelerator. It aims at supporting bottom-up innovative actions and is addressed at 
start-ups as well as small and medium-sized companies. The interest in the 
Accelerator programme is record-breaking. As of March 2020, nearly 4 thousand 
entities applied for grants. Because of this huge demand, the initial amount was 
increased (by 150 mln Euros) and the total value of funds for the projects supported 
within this programme reached 314 mln Euros (OECD, 2020).  
 
Apart from financing new projects that are to counteract the COVID-19 crisis, 
Horizon’s actions within projects already in progress were also reoriented. The 
Digital Innovation Hubs in Healthcare Robotics (“DIH-HERO”) project, an 
independent platform joining digital innovation centres in Europe, is a great 
example. Its goal is to create a stable network of cooperation among organisations 
working in robotics within the healthcare sector. In the case of fighting the COVID-
19 pandemic, a decision was made to transfer 5 mln Euros to actions aiming at 
streamlining robotics-related solutions that may be swiftly implemented in 
healthcare (OECD, 2020). Furthermore, the Horizon 2020 funds were used to 
support (optimise) various system solutions, especially the ones related to research 
infrastructure and enabling or facilitating the exchange of research data. The funding 
under Horizon 2020 is part of the Commission’s 1.4 billion Euros pledge to the 
Coronavirus Global Response initiative, launched by President Ursula von der Leyen 
in May 2020 (EC, 2000e). 
 
Funds for counteracting the COVID-19 crisis were released from other sources as 
well; for instance, the EC’s Directorate-General for Research and Innovation in 
cooperation with the European Investment Bank reviewed the priorities and 
allocated funds from the InnovFin programme so that approx. 400 mln Euros could 
be redirected to actions related to fighting the pandemic challenge through financing 
diagnostics, vaccination and treatment options. Also, nearly 6 mln Euros were 
granted by the European Institute of Innovation and Technology to health innovation 
projects across Europe (OECD, 2000). 
 
Parallel to working on the immediate response to the coronavirus pandemic, 
programmes that will be launched in the years 2021–2027 are also being developed. 
The new financial perspective that started in the beginning of 2021 involved 
establishing a new healthcare programme, EU4Health, to which 9.4 bln Euros would 
be granted. The goals of this programme are mainly oriented towards improving the 
wellbeing of EU citizens, strengthening healthcare systems and promoting 
innovation in the health sector. EU4Health is meant to fill the gaps disclosed by the 
pandemic in the healthcare systems of the member states so those systems are fit to 
face any future threats. Importantly, the EU4Heath programme is designed with the 
assumption of a close cooperation with the new framework programme, Horizon 
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Europe. It is to finance research and innovation in areas such as life-long attention to 
health; social and environmental conditions for health; non-transmittable and rare 
diseases; transmittable diseases; digital tools, technologies and solutions for health 
and healthcare systems.  
 
Moreover, funds from the new financial perspective will also support innovative 
actions related to the COVID-19 pandemic within other programmes such as the 
European Social Fund Plus which supports access to healthcare for vulnerable 
groups, the European Regional Development Fund which improves the regional 
healthcare infrastructure, the rescEU programme which establishes emergency 
reserves of medical supplies, and the Digital Europe programme which develops 
digital infrastructure essential for using digital healthcare tools. 
  
4.2 The Implementation of Market-Shaping and Mission-Oriented Innovation 
Policy Versus the COVID-19 Crisis  
 
While executing the Horizon 2020 (2014-2020) framework programme, the EU 
established the goals of research and innovation related to grand social challenges. 
As the interim assessment of this programme pointed to an insufficient effect that the 
EU’s public investments into research and innovation have on the completion of the 
goal and since there is a constant need to include the society in the undertaken 
actions at a broader extent, a revision of the adopted manners of acting and a 
determination of the possible changes in this area became essential. The concept of 
market-shaping, mission-oriented innovation policy seemed to be a perfect response 
to the problems pointed out during the assessment (Mazzucato, 2015; 2016). The 
guidelines for directing the EU’s research and innovation activities towards 
completing specific missions were included in, among others, a report prepared for 
the EC in July 2017 by the independent High Level Group on maximising the impact 
of EU research and innovation programmes (EC, 2017a).  
 
As requested by the EU, Mazzucato prepared a report (Mazzucato, 2018b) in 
February 2018 where she presented the conditions for implementing the mission-
oriented innovation policy in the EU, including, among others, criteria for creating 
and selecting missions. The decision to implement this concept of innovation policy 
in order to improve the efficiency in facing social challenges was officially 
announced by Carlos Moedas, Commissioner for research, science and innovation, 
in June 2018. It was assumed that the EU would undertake missions within the 
Horizon Europe programme.  
 
The next step was to develop the initial plan of executing five missions. The premise 
was that the goal is to provide solutions to such social problems as cancer, climate 
change, clean oceans, climate-neutral cities as well as healthy soil and food. The 
official onset of the work on shaping the missions in those areas took place in July 
2019. The proposals of five missions with feasible solutions were announced in June 
2020 (for further social consultations) (EC, 2020a; 2020b; 2020c; 2020d; 2020j), and 
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in September 2020 high-level independent experts (Missions Boards) presented their 
proposals for possible EU missions to the European Commission. At present, there is 
a preparatory phase of missions creation. The phase began in November 2020, and – 
according to the plan – it will last maximum of 12 months. 
 
As presented above, the chronology of the fundamental stages of implementing the 
mission-oriented innovation policy within the new framework programme Horizon 
Europe overlaps with the works on the planned interventions that are to counteract 
the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, from the viewpoint of programming 
intervention instruments, the above processes are carried out almost independently. 
Although the missions are supposed to be tools that boost the efficiency of solving 
problems related to major social challenges, the EU has not yet decided to create a 
mission that would directly aim at facing the problems related to the COVID-19 
crisis. There are only plans that some of the missions may response to the COVID-
19 crisis if the crisis had an impact on the problems assigned to the given mission 
area. For instance, as the COVID-19 crisis endangers food security due to 
breakdown of the international food chain, the mission in the area of soil health and 
food may, inter alia, explore the role of major European soils on global food 
security, considering climate change scenarios (EC, 2020c). Similarly, the Mission 
Board for climate-neutral and smart cities points out that ‘to make the most of the 
new EU Recovery Fund, investments should have both a multiplying effect on the 
economy and a transformative effect towards climate sustainability. Such an 
investment strategy can build on the Mission for climate neutral cities’ (EC, 2020a). 
However, the general response of the planned missions to the COVID-19 crisis 
should be regarded as limited. 
 
It is a good moment to ask a basic question, should the COVID-19 crisis be viewed 
as one of the major social challenges, the handling of which is to be supported by 
interventions using the innovation policy? Generally, treating the mission-oriented 
innovation policy as an anti-crisis tool may be undermined (as not all the crisis-
related problems need to be solved by innovation-focused missions), but in the case 
of this particular crisis it may actually be a justified approach. The unique nature of 
the discussed crisis lies in (1) the demand for innovative products and services, such 
as vaccines, medications, digital solutions supporting remote learning, and 
monitoring outbreaks of infections, as well as in (2) the wide social upheaval the 
pandemic has had on the EU, since it is difficult to recall another crisis that would 
have such a significant impact on the daily life of virtually very EU citizen. 
 
As the answer is affirmative, another issue needs to be settled, namely, is it possible, 
and justifiable, to create a mission satisfying EU’s criteria as a response to the social 
challenge of the COVID-19 crisis? As it has already been mentioned, the criteria that 
should be met by each mission have been established in Mazzucato’s report prepared 
for the EC. According to the report's recommendations, the missions should: (1) 
regard substantial and inspiring problems of significant social importance; (2) have a 
clearly established goal, measurable results and determined temporal framework; (3) 
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encompass ambitious yet achievable research and development activities; (4) be of 
an interdisciplinary and cross-sectoral nature and assume that the execution of 
innovative processes is a joint effort of several actors; and (5) promote multifaceted, 
bottom-up solutions (Mazzucato, 2018b). 
 
Analysing the COVID-19 pandemic and crisis from the perspective of the above 
criteria confirms both the possibility and sensibility of creating missions oriented 
approach towards solving the specific problems related to this challenge. 
Furthermore, when it comes to healthcare and the approach of counteracting 
COVID-19 as a disease, the answer to the above question is also positive, especially 
since there is a plan of developing a mission for another disease that threatens a large 
portion of the population, namely cancer. Additionally, even if the experts confirm 
that the progress on developing vaccines, medications and so forth is advanced 
enough to assume that this problem no longer requires justifiable support in the form 
of being included in a mission, it is possible to treat the pandemic as a new type of 
threat and direct the mission elsewhere, for example, protection against highly-
transmittable and hazardous zoonotic viruses which have been reported by 
epidemiologists to spread more frequently in the future. In other words, the array of 
possible problems to solve is very wide.  
 
In sum, the innovation policy of the EU on the supranational level is characterised 
by incoherence between the undertaken (and planned) interventions related to 
counteracting the COVID-19 crisis and the newly implemented market-shaping, 
mission-oriented innovation policy approach. On the one hand, the EU implements 
and promotes the mission-oriented policy as a theoretically more efficient method of 
solving the problems within major social challenges. On the other hand, it hardly 
uses the tools compliant with this new policy concept to fight the most recent and 
highly important social challenge, namely the COVID-19 crisis. 
  
4.3 Reasons for Not Using the Missions for Planned Interventions Aimed at 
Counteracting the COVID-19 Crisis  
 
The emerging crisis, as a source of various types of threats, initially calls for actions 
from persons responsible for overcoming it, like namely politicians and other 
decision-makers, towards the basic need – maintaining safety. However, security-
based logic shapes decision-making not only in the field of security per se but also 
beyond this area (Huysmans, 2006; Neal, 2010). Rhinard (2019) reminds us of how 
an overarching concern with insecurity, urgency and crisis can become the norm 
rather than the exception to normal policy-making. While developing this theory of 
crisisification in policy-making in the EU, Rhinard draws attention to the aspects of 
policies on the supranational level, which are useful when it comes to identifying the 
causes of the incoherence in leading the innovation policy in the EU, as mentioned 
in the previous section of the article.  
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First of all, the dynamics of the decision-making process is crucial, meaning that 
‘leaders must be seen to be taking action and Brussels-level initiatives become 
important’ (Rhinard, 2019). For this reason, EU leaders focused on a swift reaction, 
yet quick responses are not always tied with using new solutions. Second of all, 
Rhinard states that a policy that reacts to a crisis, combined with the regular 
monitoring of potential new areas affected by the crisis such as new threats, displays 
a tendency to crowd out the policy, which requires a deeper, democratic deliberation. 
Consequently, it might be expected that the EU’s policy as a COVID-19 crisis 
response may tend to pull out actions aimed at implementing new tools of innovation 
policy, even though the logic of maximising efficiency suggests the application of a 
mission-oriented policy approach in fighting the COVID-19 crisis.  
 
New light on this problem is shed by research on the success and failure in public 
policies, tied to the theories of crisis management. As McConnell (2011) states, 
“political ‘successes’ may emerge out of crisis, but also may political ‘failures’”, but 
at the same time: “assumptions about success and failure rest on ground that is less 
stable than we might think.” The fragile status of successes and failures of a policy 
conducted during a crisis is tied to the fact that evaluating crisis management 
initiatives is very difficult. However, what is problematic to the evaluators may be 
viewed in a completely different way by the politicians. In the past, the multifaceted 
nature and difficulties in assessing crisis management initiatives frequently benefited 
the politicians; it happened that they could turn into a general political success the 
actions and decisions that were not viewed as successes on their own merit.  
 
The implemented concept of mission-oriented innovation policy is an example of a 
change that facilitated the assessment of the conducted interventions. Missions are 
expected to have clearly defined and measurable goals with specific timeframes for 
their completion (Mazzucato, 2018b). It would be easily verifiable whether a 
particular mission was successful and it might be expected that a political success 
will be difficult to achieve if the mission fails.  
 
Furthermore, McConnell (2011) draws attention to the fact that the “destructive 
capacities of crises can to some degree be prevented, prepared for, managed, 
recovered from and learned about, through adherence to certain principles which 
should be embedded in institutional structures, rules and procedures, as well as the 
cognitive processes of actors.” The underlying logic is that certain processes are best 
practice and that neglecting these generates a risk of failure. From the above 
perspective, following a well-travelled road generates a sense of lowering the risk of 
failure and reaching for new solutions increases it. For this reason, namely the fear 
of failure, EU decision-makers may reach for what they already know by relying on 
already tested policy instruments and distance themselves from the idea of 
counteracting the COVID-19 pandemic by applying the mission-oriented innovation 
policy approach. Those cautious attitudes are conditioned by other factors as well in 
the case of a health and social crisis as serious as the one triggered by the 
coronavirus. EU leaders must face the risk of failure stemming from objective 
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difficulties in planning a complex policy that is to encompass various recipients, 
their behaviour, lack of sufficient information, and the uncertain future (which 




Supranational actions undertaken by the EU that are to counteract (by means of the 
innovation policy tools) the COVID-19 pandemic and related crisis are 
chronologically intertwined with the endeavours tied to implementing the market-
shaping, mission-oriented innovation policy approach in the EU. The COVID-19 
pandemic came to Europe while the EU was working on the ways of implementing 
the concept of a mission-oriented policy within one of the main supranational 
instruments of its innovation policy, namely the framework programme Horizon 
Europe. It was a time when the mission areas were already outlined, large-scale 
social consultations were completed (EC, 2018), teams responsible for shaping 
specific missions were appointed and the works aiming at developing plans of 
executing particular missions so as to select the ones to be carried out were already 
officially announced. The plans that the EU sketched for the mission areas and 
implementation have hardly changed to date, except for the extension of the 
preparatory phase of missions creation and the limited response to the problems of 
the COVID-19 crisis that appear within the areas of the planned missions. 
 
This article points to the incoherence that characterise the EU’s innovation policy on 
the supranational level. It lies in the fact that the EU implements and promotes the 
mission-oriented policy as, theoretically, the most efficient tool in handing major 
social challenges, but at the same time does not show many signs, even in its plans, 
of attempting to apply the tools compliant with this concept to fight the most current 
social challenge, namely the COVID-19 crisis. As for the reasons for such a state of 
affairs, the following points are the most important: (1) the political pressure for a 
swift reaction to a crisis, (2) crowding out by the policy which responds to the crisis 
all other activities that require deeper, democratic deliberation, and (3) the fear of 
failure and the determination to lower the risk of failure by resorting to the known 
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